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We propose a boundedly-rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to
persuasion bias; that is, they fail to account for possible repetition in the information they receive.
We show that persuasion bias implies the phenomenon of social inuence, whereby one's inuence
on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is in the
social network that determines communication. Persuasion bias also implies the phenomenon
of unidimensional opinions; that is, individuals' opinions over a multidimensional set of issues
converge to a single \left-right" spectrum. We explore the implications of our model in several
natural settings, including political science and marketing, and we obtain a number of novel
empirical implications.
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All errors are our own.I Introduction
In this paper, we propose a model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to persuasion
bias, failing to adjust properly for possible repetitions of information they receive. We argue that
persuasion bias provides a simple explanation for several important phenomena that are otherwise
hard to rationalize, such as propaganda, censorship, marketing, and the importance of air-time. We
show that persuasion bias implies two additional phenomena. First, that of social inuence, whereby
one's inuence on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is
in the social network according to which communication takes place. Second, that of unidimensional
opinions, whereby individuals' opinions over a multidimensional set of issues can be represented by
a single \left-right" spectrum.
To motivate persuasion bias, consider an individual who reads an article in a newspaper with a
well-known political slant. Under full rationality, the individual should anticipate that the arguments
presented in the article will reect the newspaper's general political views. Moreover, the individual
should have a prior assessment about how strong these arguments are likely to be. Upon reading the
article, the individual should update his political beliefs in line with this assessment. In particular,
the individual should be swayed towards the newspaper's views if the arguments presented in the
article are stronger than expected, and away from them if the arguments are weaker than expected.
On average, however, reading the article should have no eect on the individual's beliefs. Formally,
under full rationality, beliefs must follow martingales.1
The martingale result seems, however, in contrast with casual observation. It seems, in particular,
that newspapers do sway readers towards their views, even when these views are publicly known.
A natural explanation of this phenomenon, that we pursue in this paper, is that individuals fail
to adjust properly for repetitions of information. In the example above, repetition occurs because
the article reects the newspaper's general political views, expressed also in previous articles. An
individual who fails to adjust for this repetition (by not discounting appropriately the arguments
presented in the article), would be predictably swayed towards the newspaper's views, and the more
so, the more articles he reads.2 We refer to the failure to adjust properly for information repetitions
as persuasion bias, to highlight that this bias is related to persuasive activity.
More generally, the failure to adjust for repetitions can apply not only to information coming
from one source over time, but also to information coming from multiple sources connected through a
social network. Suppose, for example, that two individuals speak to one another about an issue after
having both spoken to a common third party on the issue. Then, if the two conferring individuals do
not account for the fact that their counterpart's opinion is based on some of the same (third party)
1Suppose that, starting from t = 0, the individual reads the article at t = 1. Denote by It the individual's information
set at date t, and by xt the individual's political beliefs at that date, e.g., xt = Pr(Policy A is goodjIt). Then, the
law of iterative expectations implies that E[x1jI0] = x0, i.e., reading the article should have no expected eect on the
individual's beliefs.
2Formally, we are arguing that the change in the individual's beliefs can be predicted based on the newspaper's
political slant, even when this political slant is known to the individual, i.e., is included in I0. For example, if the
newspaper is pro-Policy A of footnote 1, then we are arguing that E[x1jI0] > x0.
1information as their own opinion, they will double-count the third party's opinion.
Our notion of persuasion bias can be viewed as a simple, boundedly-rational heuristic for dealing
with a very complicated inference problem. Correctly adjusting for repetitions would require indi-
viduals to recount not only the source of all the information that has played a role in forming their
beliefs, but also the information that led to the beliefs of those they listen to, of those who those
they listen to listen to, and so on. This would become extremely complicated with just a few indi-
viduals and a few rounds of updating, to say nothing of a large population of individuals, interacting
according to a social network, where beliefs are derived from multiple sources over an extended time
period. Under persuasion bias instead, individuals update sensibly, as Bayesians, except that they
do not account accurately for which components of the information they receive is new and which
is repetition. This notion corresponds with social psychology theories of political opinion formation.
In particular, Lodge [1995] develops an on-line model of information processing, where individuals
receive messages from campaigns, and integrate their interpretation of the message into a \running
tally" for the candidate, while forgetting the details (e.g., source) of the message. We elaborate on
the running-tally interpretation of persuasion bias in Section II.
Persuasion bias is consistent with psychological evidence. Several studies document that the
simple repetition of statements increases the subjects' belief in the statements' validity. The inter-
pretation given by these studies is that repetition makes the statements more familiar, and familiarity
serves as a cue to validity (that is, subjects are more likely to believe a statement if it \rings a bell").3
Closely related to familiarity, are the notions of salience and availability: repetition can have an ef-
fect because it makes statements more salient/available in the subjects' memory.4 Our analysis is
consistent with such evidence. Indeed, while we emphasize the interpretation of persuasion bias as
a boundedly-rational heuristic for an otherwise intractable problem, the eect of repetition in our
model could alternatively arise from familiarity, salience, or limited memory.5
Persuasion bias yields a direct explanation for a number of important phenomena. Consider, for
example, the issue of air-time in political campaigns and court trials. A political debate without
equal time for both sides, or a criminal trial in which the defense was given less time to present
its case than the prosecution, would generally be considered biased and unfair.6 This seems at
odds with a rational model. Indeed, listening to a political candidate should, in expectation, have
no eect on a rational individual's opinion, and thus, the candidate's air-time should not matter.
By contrast, under persuasion bias, the repetition of arguments made possible by more air-time
3The repetition-induced increase in validity has been labeled the \truth eect." See, for example, Hawkins and Hoch
[1992], and the references therein. A somewhat related notion is that upon hearing a statement, individuals store it in
their memory as \true," and then engage in costly processing to determine whether it is actually true or false. (See,
for example, Gilbert [1991].) Under this notion, however, it is unclear why hearing a statement repeatedly would have
a cumulative eect, i.e., why persuasion would be eective.
4On salience and availability bias see, for example, Tversky and Kahneman [1973], Nisbett and Ross [1980], and
Fiske and Taylor [1984]. See also Zallner [1992] for memory-based theories of political opinion formation whereby
beliefs depend on probabilistic memory with more likely recall for recent considerations.
5Additionally, our model does not preclude the possibility that the eect of repetition arises because individuals
under-react to information initially, and then adjust over time.
6Indeed, inequities in fundraising seem to be such a contentious issue in political campaigns precisely because
unequal funds can be used to purchase unequal air-time.
2can have an eect.7 Other phenomena that can be readily understood with persuasion bias are
marketing, propaganda, and censorship. In all these cases, there seems to be a common notion that
repeated exposures to an idea have a greater eect on the listener than a single exposure. More
generally, persuasion bias can explain why individuals' beliefs often seem to evolve in a predictable
manner towards the standard, and publicly known, views of groups with which they interact (be
they professional, social, political, or geographical groups) { a phenomenon considered indisputable
and foundational by most sociologists.8 We elaborate on a number of these phenomena and discuss
additional related applications in Section V.
While these phenomena follow immediately from our assumption of persuasion bias, the primary
goal of our model is to analyze the dynamics of beliefs under this bias. This analysis yields several
deeper implications of our notion of persuasion bias: in particular, the phenomena of social inuence
and unidimensional opinions. To describe these phenomena, we need to briey describe our model.
The essence of our model is as follows. A set of agents start with imperfect information on
an unknown parameter, and then communicate according to a social network. The network is
represented as a directed graph indicating whether agent i \listens to" agent j. This graph, or
\listening structure," is exogenous and can correspond to geographical proximity (neighbors, co-
workers), social relationships (friendship, club membership), hierarchical relationships (position in
an organizational chart), etc. Communication occurs over multiple rounds. In each round, agents
listen to the beliefs of others according to the listening structure, and then update their own beliefs.
For simplicity, we assume that agents report their beliefs truthfully.9 Our key assumption is that
agents are subject to persuasion bias; that is, they fail to adjust for possible repetitions of information
they receive, instead treating all information as new.
In this setting we show that with sucient communication, the beliefs of all agents converge over
time to a weighted average of initial beliefs. The weight associated to any given agent measures the
agent's impact on the group's beliefs, and can naturally be interpreted as the agent's social inuence.
We show that an agent's social inuence depends both on how many other agents listen to him, and
on the endogenously determined social inuence of those agents.
7A rational explanation for the importance of air-time, or persuasion more generally, is that the resources one
spends on persuasive activity can signal the accuracy of one's opinion. This explanation can apply, however, only
when persuasive activity is chosen endogenously. Yet, persuasive opportunities, such as air-time, are perceived to be
important even when they are allocated exogenously by some prior mechanism such as courtroom or debate procedures.
Uneven allocation of campaign nancing funds or access to debates are contentious issues in political campaigns, even
when this is done according to well-specied rules set in advance. Furthermore, parties engaged in persuasive activity
often seem to try to downplay or hide the amount of resources they have expended in this activity. Politicians do not
publicly boast about funds they have raised (rather, their opponents point this out), and marketers frequently look for
subtle ways to advertise, where their inuence will be hidden.
8For a classic case study, see Festinger, Schachter, and Back [1950] who study the evolution of beliefs among residents
of MIT dormitories. This study argues that the nature of group inuence is related to the underlying social network
in the group, for which frequency of contact plays an important role (see Chapter 3 on the Spatial Ecology of Group
Formation).
9We are thus ignoring issues of strategic communication. Ignoring these issues is reasonable in many settings (e.g.,
sharing of political opinions or stock market views among friends and colleagues). And as will be seen, our notion
of persuasion will yield interesting biases in the evolution of beliefs, absent any strategic behavior. Nonetheless, in
many persuasive settings (e.g., political campaigns and court trials) agents clearly do have incentives to strategically
misreport their beliefs. We discuss the interaction of strategic behavior with our notion of persuasion in Section V.
3Note that if instead the information of all agents in the group were aggregated optimally, one's
inuence on the group's beliefs would depend only on the accuracy of one's initial information. In
our setting, however, inuence is determined not only by accuracy, but also by network position.
This seems quite realistic: well-connected individuals often seem to be very inuential in a way that
is not necessarily related to the accuracy of their information.10 We show that persuasion bias is
crucial for this phenomenon: if agents are fully rational, know the entire social network, and can
consequently perform the complicated calculations to adjust for information repetitions, information
is aggregated optimally, and inuence is solely determined by accuracy.11 Under persuasion bias
instead, well-connected agents are inuential because their information is repeated many times in
the social network.
Persuasion bias implies an additional general phenomenon that we refer to as unidimensional
opinions. Quite often, individuals' opinions over a multidimensional set of issues can be well approx-
imated by a simple one-dimensional line, where an individual's position on the line (i.e., \left" or
\right") determines the individual's position on all issues. For example, many individuals' opinions
on a wide range of essentially unrelated issues, ranging from free trade to military spending to envi-
ronmental regulation to abortion, can be characterized by the single measure of how conservative or
liberal they are.12
The phenomenon of unidimensional opinions follows in our model by considering the long-run
dierences of opinion between agents. Even though beliefs converge over time, at any point in
time there is disagreement. Obviously, for any single issue, we can characterize this disagreement
by agents' relative positions along an interval. Quite interestingly, we show that with sucient
communication, and for a general class of networks, an agent's relative position on any issue will
be the same. For example, if an agent has an extreme viewpoint on one issue, his viewpoint will
be extreme on all issues. Thus, in the long run, a simple left-right characterization can be used to
identify agents' beliefs on all issues. Moreover, the relative position of an agent, and the association
of beliefs (i.e., which collection of beliefs dene the \left" vs. \right" leanings), can be predicted
based on the social network and the initial beliefs.
We explore the implications of our model in several particular settings. One natural setting
is when agents live in neighborhoods (dened by geographical proximity, cultural proximity, social
relationships, etc.) and listen to their neighbors. In this setting it is natural to presume that com-
munication is bilateral, i.e., the listening relationship is symmetric. Under bilateral communication,
10As an example, consider the individuals participating in internet chat rooms on nancial investments. Many of
these individuals have inaccurate (and sometimes false) information. However, the fact that they have a large audience,
and are thus \well-connected," can give them enough inuence to aect market prices. For example, the Wall Street
Journal (November 6, 2000) reports that \Preliminary gures show that market manipulation accounted for 8% of
the roughly 500 cases the SEC brought in scal 2000, ended Sept. 30, up from 3% in scal 1999. `Manipulation
on the Internet is where the action is,' and appears to be replacing brokerage `boiler rooms' of the past, said SEC
enforcement-division director Richard Walker."
11For general results on communication between rational agents see, for example, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
[1982] and Parikh and Krasucki [1990].
12That political opinions can be well approximated by a simple unidimensional structure is a well accepted principle
in political science. See Section V for further discussion and references.
4the relative social inuence weights can be computed explicitly, and depend only on characteristics of
each agent's local neighborhood. (For example, they depend on the number of the agents' neighbors
but - somewhat surprisingly - not on the number of their neighbors' neighbors.) For the special case
where neighborhoods have a linear structure, we explicitly compute long-run dierences of opinion
and show that these are smallest between neighbors. Hence, agents end up listening to those with
similar beliefs - not because we have assumed that neighbors are chosen on the basis of common
beliefs, but rather because neighbors' beliefs evolve to being similar through the social updating
process.
We explore, more informally, a number of important applications of our model, including political
discourse, court trials, and marketing. We argue that our model provides a useful way for thinking
about opinion formation in these settings, and has a number of novel empirically testable predictions.
One prediction, for example, is that political views should follow a unidimensional pattern, and that
adherence to this pattern should be greater for issues that are frequently discussed (which can be
proxied by media coverage). Additionally, the similarity between the views of dierent individuals
should depend on how close these individuals are in the social network. Thus, the relative importance
of dierent demographic factors in explaining individuals' political orientation should be related to
the relative importance of such factors in determining social interaction.
This paper is related to several literatures. In addition to the psychology literatures on belief
formation discussed earlier, there is a formal relation to a mathematical sociology literature on social
networks. This literature considers measures of \social power," \centrality," and \status," and how
they can be derived from the structure of the social network. In particular, French [1956] and
Harary [1959] consider an abstract model of social power evolution which has dynamics similar to
ours.13 There are several important dierences between our work and this literature. First, while
the concepts of social power and centrality are somewhat abstract, we focus concretely on beliefs.
This allows us to interpret our dynamics relative to rational updating, and makes clear the precise
behavioral assumptions underlying our model. Second, we derive new results on the dynamics,
including a characterization of long-run dierences in beliefs. Third, we derive new analytical results
and empirical predictions for a variety of applications, such as neighborhoods, political science, court
trials, and marketing.
Also related is the theoretical literature on social learning, in which agents are assumed to choose
actions over time based on information received from others.14 As in the social learning literature,
agents communicate with others and update their beliefs. Unlike that literature, however, the up-
dating process is subject to persuasion bias. Because of persuasion bias, communication becomes a
mechanism for exerting inuence: well-connected individuals can inuence others in a way that is
13More recent treatments include Wasserman and Faust [1994] and Bonacich and Lloyd [2001]. Dynamics similar to
those in French and Harary are obtained in a statistics literature starting with DeGroot [1974]. See also Press [1978]
and Berger [1981].
14See, for example, Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [1992], and Ellison and Fudenberg [1993],
where agents receive information from the entire population, and Ellison and Fudenberg [1995], where agents receive
information from their neighbors. See also Bala and Goyal [1998] for a general neighborhood structure, analogous to
our network structure.
5not warranted by the accuracy of their information.
Finally, this paper is related to an empirical literature which examines whether social networks
inuence individuals' outcomes.15 The ndings of this literature suggest that social networks do
indeed have an eect: for example, controlling for many relevant characteristics, individuals are
more likely to participate in welfare programs if their neighbors do, and are likely to invest in a
similar way to their neighbors.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III analyzes the
dynamics of agents' beliefs, and shows the phenomena of social inuence and unidimensional opinions.
Section IV applies the model to neighborhoods, and Section V to political discourse, court trials,
and marketing. Section VI concludes, and all proofs are in the Appendix.
II The Model
We consider a setting where a nite set of agents N = f1;2;:::;Ng wish to estimate an unknown
parameter  2 RL (we later interpret each dimension in RL as a dierent \issue"). Agents start with
some initial information on . For simplicity of exposition, we assume here that this information
consists of normally distributed noisy estimates of , though below we observe that our analysis also
applies to a very general, distribution-free setting of \observations." Specically, agent i 2 N starts
with a noisy signal x0
i =  + i, where i 2 RL is an error term whose components are mean zero,
independent across agents and dimensions, and normally distributed. We assume that agent i assigns
initial precision 0
ij to agent j, and this precision applies to all components of agent j's error term,
i.e., 0
ij = V ari[j`] 1, for ` = 1;:::;L. (For generality, we allow i's assessment of j's precision to be
subjective, but it could also be objectively correct for all agents.)
Upon receiving their initial information, agents communicate according to a social network. We
describe the network as a directed graph indicating whether agent i listens to agent j. We denote
by S(i)  N the set of agents that agent i listens to, and by qij 2 f0;1g the indicator function of
S(i), i.e., qij = 1 if and only if j 2 S(i). We refer to the set S(i) as the listening set of agent i, and
to the function S as the listening structure. Since agent i knows his own information (he listens to
himself), i 2 S(i).
Communication occurs over multiple rounds. In each round, agents listen to the beliefs of those
in their listening set (where beliefs will be explained below), and then update their own beliefs. As
discussed in the introduction and in greater length in Section V, we assume that agents report their
beliefs truthfully.
We model our notion of persuasion bias by presuming that agents treat all information they
receive as new, ignoring possible repetitions. With only one communication round, the information
agents receive is genuinely new, since the error terms i in agents' signals are independent. Hence,
15See, for example, Case and Katz [1991], Evans, Oates, and Schwab [1992], Borjas [1995], Glaeser, Sacerdote, and
Scheinkman [1996], Katz, Kling, and Liebman [1999], Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan [2000], Duo and Saez
[2000], Madrian and Shea [2000], and Hong and Stein [2001].
6there is no persuasion bias, and agents update their beliefs in an optimal manner, giving weight to
others' information in proportion to the precision they ascribe to them. With multiple communication
rounds, however, agents' information involves repetitions. These arise both because one listens to
the same set of agents over time, and because those agents might be reporting information from
overlapping sources. Agents, however, treat such repetitions as new information. Specically, agents
treat the information they hear in each round as new and independent, and ascribe the same relative
precisions to those they listen to as in the rst round (not adjusting for the fact that over time, the
information of some agents might contain more repetitions than that of others).
Correctly adjusting for repetitions would impose a heavy computational burden on the agents.
Suppose, for example, that an agent, say i, listens to two other agents, who themselves listen to
overlapping sets of agents. Then, agent i must know the extent to which the listening sets of
the two agents overlap, in order to adjust for the correlation in the information he is receiving.
Moreover, he must recall the information he has received from each of the two agents in the previous
communication rounds, to disentangle old information from new. (For example, in the second round,
the old information consists of the signals of the two agents, and the new information of the signals
of those the two agents listen to.) With multiple communication rounds, such calculations would
become quite laborious, even if the agent knew the entire social network. If instead, the agent did
not know the entire network (as is likely to be the case in large networks), the agent would have to
instead try to infer the sources of his sources' information from the reports he received. Even for a
simple network, this appears to be an extremely complicated problem that does not beget an obvious
solution.16
Persuasion bias can be viewed as a simple, boundedly-rational heuristic for dealing with the
above complicated inference problem, when agents cannot determine (or recall) the source of all the
information that has played a role in forming their beliefs. Agents might instead simply maintain a
\running tally" summarizing their current beliefs, as in Lodge's [1995] conception of on-line infor-
mation processing. Furthermore, upon hearing such a summary from someone else, agents would be
unable to distinguish which part is new information, and which part is information already incor-
porated into their own beliefs. Agents might then simply integrate the information they hear into
their running tally, using an updating rule that would be optimal if the information were new. This
is precisely what agents do under persuasion bias.
Formally, communication and updating in our model are as follows. In the rst communication
round, agent i learns the signals of the agents in S(i). Given normality and agents' xed assessment
of the precision of others' information, a sucient statistic for these signals is their weighted average,
with weights given by the precisions. We denote this statistic by x1
i, and refer to it as agent i's beliefs
16Instead of requiring agents to know the entire social network, agents could alternatively communicate not only their
beliefs, but also the sources of their information, the sources of their sources, etc. Such communication, however, would
be extremely complicated: the information agents would need to recall and communicate would increase exponentially
with the number of rounds.















ij denotes the precision that agent i assigns to his beliefs. We refer to equation
(1) as agent i's updating rule.17
In the updating rule (1), agent j gets non-zero weight if qij = 1 (i listens to j) and 0
ij > 0 (i
believes j's information is useful). From now on, we assume that agent i believes that the information
of all agents he listens to is useful, i.e., 0
ij > 0 for all j 2 S(i). This is without loss of generality: if
i listens to an agent without useful information, then we can exclude that agent from S(i) without
changing that agent's (zero) weight. The agents who are not in S(i) can thus be interpreted as those
with whom i has either no direct contact, or no faith in the validity of their information.
The updating rule (1) can be expressed more succinctly in vector notation. Denote by xt the
matrix whose ith row is the vector xt
i of agent i's beliefs in communication round t. Denote also by
T the listening matrix with elements
Tij = qij 0
ij=1
ii: (2)
Then, the updating rule (1) can be expressed as
x1 = Tx0: (3)
To illustrate the above notation, we consider the following example.
Example 1 Suppose that N = 4, S(1) = f1;2g, S(2) = f1;2;3g, S(3) = f1;2;3;4g, and S(4) =
f1;3;4g. This listening structure depicts a setting where four agents are ordered along a line, with
everyone listening to their direct neighbors, themselves, and agent 1 even when agent 1 is not a direct
neighbor. Then, if each agent believes that all agents he listens to have equal precision, the listening
































The directed graph corresponding to the listening structure S is depicted in Figure 1. We use this
listening structure in Section III as a running example.
Beliefs (i.e., a sucient statistic for an agent's information) followed a linear updating rule in (1)
by normality. Linearity, however, also holds for the following very general, distribution-free setting.
Suppose that for each dimension ` of , agents start with some \observations," rather than with a
single signal. Suppose that observations are identically distributed, independent conditional on `,
17To be precise, this equation determines a sucient statistic for agent i's information (for a given precision), rather
than i's posterior estimate of . The posterior estimate also depends upon i's prior on , and coincides with the
sucient statistic if the prior is diuse. By assuming that agents communicate raw data rather than posteriors, we
focus on how data is aggregated by the social network, absent any eect of the priors.
8and with outcomes drawn from a nite set.18 Then, for a given number of observations, a sucient
statistic of an agent's observations is the empirical frequency distribution of the observed outcomes.
If agents in turn communicate this sucient statistic, then they should update exactly as above: the
empirical frequency distribution that agent i computes after the rst communication round will be
given by equation (1), where now 0
ij represents agent i's assessment of the number of observations
that underlie agent j's initial distribution.
Turning to multiple communication rounds, our persuasion assumption is that agents ignore
repetitions of information. Rather, agents treat the information they hear in each round as new and
independent, and ascribe the same relative weights to those they listen to as in the rst round. We
do allow, however, agents to vary the weight they give to their own beliefs relative to outsiders over
time as they update more. Thus, agents' beliefs after round t + 1 are given by
xt+1 = Tt xt; (4)
where Tt denotes the matrix given by
Tt = (1   t)I + tT; (5)
where t 2 (0;1]. These belief dynamics, given by (4) and (5), are the focus of our analysis.19
III Belief Dynamics
In this section, we study the dynamics of beliefs under persuasion bias. We determine the long-run
limit to which agents' beliefs converge, and the nature of agents' long-run dierences of opinion.
Furthermore, we characterize these as a function of the social network according to which agents
communicate.
The dynamics of beliefs are given by equations (4) and (5). Setting T()  ((1   )I + T), we
18Interpreting agents' information as consisting of observations is sensible in many settings, ranging from formal
scientic experiments to the experiences consumers have regarding the quality of a product.
19While we consider belief dynamics for a general process ftgt, it is worth noting that specic models of how agents
perceive the information of others to evolve will give rise to specic processes. One simple model is that of equal








ii for all i, j, and
t, where 
t
ij denotes the precision that agent i assigns to the information he hears from agent j in round t + 1. Under
this model, the matrix Tt is constant over time and equal to T, i.e., t = 1.
Another natural, though slightly more complicated, model is that of increasing self-condence, where agents assume




ij for all i, j 6= i, and t.



















ii(1 + k(t + 1))] for




Note that equations (4) and (5) do not preclude the possibility that the eect of repetition arises because individuals
under-react to their initial information, and then adjust over time. Such under-reaction corresponds to 0 < 1.








Since each row of the matrix T sums to one, the same is true for T() and hence for
Qt 1
s=0 T(s).20
Therefore, the beliefs of an agent i after any communication round are a weighted average of all
agents' initial beliefs. The weight of agent j can naturally be interpreted as j's inuence on i.










and the direct inuence of agent j on agent i is Tij.
The agents having a direct inuence on i are those in i's listening set S(i). These agents inuence
i in the rst communication round, since w1
ij = T(0)ij and 0 > 0. In the second communication
round, i is inuenced by agents who inuenced agents in S(i) in the rst round. That is, w2
ij is
positive for agents j such that j 2 S(k) and k 2 S(i). Continuing in this fashion, we see that for
large enough t, i is inuenced by agents in the set
S(i)  fj : j 2 S(k1);k1 2 S(k2);:::;kr 1 2 S(kr);kr 2 S(i)g:
III.A Belief Convergence and Social Inuence
We next show that under general conditions, beliefs converge to a limit which is common to all
agents. This means that in the long run agents reach a consensus. We characterize the consensus
beliefs, and examine whether they aggregate optimally agents' initial information.
A necessary condition for consensus is that agents are not isolated from each other. If j 62 S(i)
(i.e., agent j does not inuence agent i) and i 62 S(j) (i.e., i does not inuence j) then j's beliefs
are never incorporated into i's, and vice versa. To rule this out, we assume that the set N of agents
is strongly connected, in the following sense:
Denition 2 A set A of agents is strongly connected if for all i 2 A, A  S(i).
If N is strongly connected, then every agent inuences every other agent, and thus agents are not
isolated from each other.
Additionally, to reach consensus, agents must not become too xed in their beliefs, i.e., t must
not go to zero too quickly. Otherwise, agents would stop updating and consensus would not be
reached. To rule this out, we make the following assumption:

















t=0 t = 1.
Assumption 1 is satised for many plausible specications of t, and in particular, those mentioned
in footnote 19. We maintain Assumption 1 throughout our analysis.
Theorem 1 Suppose N is strongly connected, and Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a vector of











The vector w is given by the unique solution to wT = w. We refer to wj as the social inuence of
agent j.
The intuition for this result can be seen by relating our model to the standard theory of nite
Markov chains. To do this, consider a Markov chain whose set of states is the set of agents N,
and whose one-step transition probability from state i to state j is Tij. Then the t-step transition
probability from i to j is (Tt)ij, i.e., the inuence weight wt
ij in the case where t = 1 for all t.
Our assumption that N is strongly connected implies that the Markov chain is irreducible. Fur-
thermore, the Markov chain is aperiodic since Tii > 0. (We have Tii > 0 in our model, since agents
listen to themselves, i.e., i 2 S(i).) It is well known that a nite, irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain
has a unique stationary distribution, i.e., a unique probability distribution w satisfying wT = w.
Moreover, starting from any state i, the probability of being in state j at date t converges to wj
as t ! 1.21 This means that the inuence weight wt
ij converges to wj (and thus beliefs converge
to a consensus belief) if t = 1. What remains to show is that one still gets convergence, and the
limit is the same, for any process t satisfying Assumption 1. That the limit is the same (assuming
that convergence occurs) follows from T() being a weighted average of T and the identity matrix.
Intuitively, if all agents uniformly put more weight on their own beliefs, this does not aect the
path of convergence, but only the speed at which beliefs converge. \Enough" weight must be put on
others' beliefs, however, to ensure that convergence does occur. In the proof we show that \enough"
weight is determined precisely by whether Assumption 1 holds or not.
The weight wi can be interpreted as the social inuence that agent i has on the consensus beliefs.
To gain some intuition on how social inuence depends on the listening structure, we consider








. Not surprisingly, this example demonstrates that an agent is inuential if he is
listened to by many other agents. Thus, the most inuential agent is agent 1, the only agent listened
to by all other agents. Less obvious, however, is the insight that an agent's inuence depends not
21See, for example, Aldous and Fill [1999, Ch. 2] and the references therein.
11only on the number of agents who listen to that agent, but also on whether those agents themselves
are inuential. Indeed, both agents 2 and 3 are listened to by the same number of agents. However,
agent 2 is more inuential than agent 3 because he is listened to by the inuential agent 1 (in addition
to agent 3) while agent 3 is listened to by the less inuential agent 4 (in addition to agent 2). To
formalize this intuition, recall that Tij is the direct inuence of j on i. Then, the condition wT = w
can be restated as the following immediate corollary:22
Corollary 1 The social inuence of agent i is the sum over j of the direct inuence of i on j (i.e.,
Tji) times the social inuence of j.
Having characterized the consensus beliefs, we next examine whether these beliefs are correct in
the sense of being optimal aggregates of agents' initial information. This question is most meaningful
when agents hold correct beliefs about others' precision so we assume this for the remainder of this
subsection: 0
ij = ^ 0
j for all i;j, where ^ 0
i is the true precision of agent i's initial information. Then,









In general, it is obvious that consensus beliefs under persuasion will not yield the optimal aggregation
of information. In fact, dening the self-weight Tjj as agent j's self-importance, Theorem 2 states
that consensus beliefs are correct if and only if the listening structure is balanced, in the sense that
the total self-importance of those who listen to each agent is equal to one.
Theorem 2 Suppose 0
ij = ^ 0
j for all i;j. Then, the consensus beliefs are correct if and only if for
all i, X
j
qjiTjj = 1: (6)
Typically, listening structures are unbalanced. For example, any listening structure in which
an agent is listened to by a subset of those listening to another agent is unbalanced. There are,
however, some non-trivial balanced listening structures. For example, suppose that all agents have
equal precision (^ 0
i = ^ 0
j for all i;j). Then, any listening structure where there exists an n such that
each agent listens to, and is listened to by, exactly n agents is balanced. (An example is when agents
are on a circle, and each agent listens to his two neighbors.)
Intuitively, for an unbalanced listening structure, consensus beliefs are incorrect because well-
connected agents have inuence in excess of the accuracy of their information. This excess inuence
derives from persuasion bias: the information of well-connected agents is repeated many times in the
social network, and no adjustment is made for the repetitions. This notion is formalized in Theorem
3, which indicates that when agents are not subject to persuasion bias, and the social network is
common knowledge, consensus beliefs are correct.
22Statements similar to that in Corollary 1 are often taken as dening \axioms" of (rather than derived results about)
social power in the mathematical sociology literature. See, for example, Bonacich and Lloyd [2001].
12Theorem 3 Suppose agents are fully rational (i.e., not subject to persuasion bias), the social network
is common knowledge, N is strongly connected, and 0
ij = ^ 0
j for all i;j. Then, agents converge to
the correct beliefs ^ x after at most N2 rounds of updating.
The intuition for this result is quite simple. Recall from Section II that agents can adjust for
repetitions if they know the structure of the social network, and can keep track of all the information
they have learned in the previous rounds. The latter information consists of linear combinations of
other agents' signals, and since agents know the structure of the social network, they know what
these linear combinations are. With enough communication rounds, agents learn enough linear
combinations as to deduce the signal of every agent in the network.
We should emphasize that the calculations that agents must perform even in this simple case
where the network is common knowledge can be very complicated. In fact, the proof of the theorem
is not constructive, i.e., we do not determine the linear combinations that an agent receives. Rather,
we show that in each round where agents have not converged to the correct beliefs, at least one agent
must learn a new linear combination.
III.B Long-Run Dierences of Opinion and Unidimensionality
Even though agents' beliefs converge over time, at any point in time there is disagreement. In
this subsection we characterize the relative disagreement, or relative \dierences of opinion." This
characterization is important for applications, such as political science, where relative opinions are
the most relevant.23




i be the average of the population beliefs. To measure relative
disagreement on \issue" (i.e., belief dimension) `, we take the dierence between agent i's beliefs on
this issue, xt
i`, and the average population beliefs. We also express this dierence in relative terms,










j    xtk
;
where kxk denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector x.24 The relative dierence of opinion dt
i` will be
positive or negative, depending upon whether agent i's beliefs are to the \right" or \left" of average
on issue `.
Initially, an agent might be to the right on some issues, and to the left on others. Our main result
23 Indeed, it is not at all clear how to measure \absolute" disagreement in many contexts. One could argue that
liberal and conservative views in the United States are very dissimilar; on the other hand, taken in the broad context
of possible political views (fascism, communism, monarchy, anarchy, etc.), they can also be seen as extremely close.
24Our results do not depend on the particular choice of the weights used to compute the \average" population beliefs.
Equal weights are a natural choice, but any other weighted average can be used without changing the results. (In fact,
in the proof of Theorem 4, we consider a general weight vector ^ w.) Our results also do not depend on the particular
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t




j0`j. We choose a
normalization that is issue-independent to emphasize that this normalization plays no role in our results.
13in this section is that with sucient communication, and for a general class of networks, an agent's
relative position on any issue will be the same. That is, in the long run, if agent i is \moderately to
the right" on one issue, then agent i will be moderately to the right on all issues. This implies that
long-run dierences of opinion across all issues can be summarized by identifying agents on a simple
\left-right" spectrum. In this case, we say that long-run dierences of opinion are unidimensional.
To illustrate the unidimensionality result, consider the listening structure of Example 1. Figure
2 illustrates the dynamics of beliefs in this example for two distinct issues represented by the two
axes. Initially (t = 1), beliefs are arbitrary. For example, agents 1 and 4 are similar with regard to
the \vertical" issue, but at opposite extremes with regard to the \horizontal" issue. However, after
16 rounds of communication, beliefs appear to lie along a single line. Agent 1 is now at one extreme
on both issues, agents 3 and 4 are at the other extreme on both issues, and agent 2 holds moderate
views.25
We will show that the convergence to unidimensional beliefs is a quite typical result of communi-
cation under persuasion bias. Moreover, the nature of the long-run disagreement (i.e., the line along
which beliefs dier) and the long-run positions of individual agents are determined from the listening
structure.
Recall that the dynamics of beliefs are determined by the listening matrix T through equations
(4) and (5). Since T can be interpreted as the transition matrix of a nite, irreducible, and aperiodic
Markov chain, it has a unique eigenvalue equal to one, and all other eigenvalues with modulus
smaller than one. The row eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue coincides with the
social inuence weights (since wT = w), and thus characterizes the beliefs to which agents ultimately
converge. As we show below, the row and column eigenvectors corresponding to the second largest
eigenvalue characterize the long-run dierences of opinion.
Dening the second largest eigenvalue is complicated because eigenvalues might be complex, and
because they must be ranked according to the ranking of their counterparts in T(t) for t large. The




where ()  (1   ) + ,  is the limit of t when t goes to 1, and kk the modulus of the
complex number .26 Based on this ranking, we let n be the nth largest eigenvalue, and V r
n and V c
n
the nth row and column eigenvectors, respectively. Of course, ties in the ranking are possible. We
assume, however, that except for complex conjugate pairs, there are no ties. This is true for generic
matrices, and thus our result below applies to generic listening structures.27
We can now state our result regarding the unidimensionality of long-run dierences of opinion.
25Thus, we might describe agent 1 as \right-wing," agents 3 and 4 as \left-wing," and agent 2 as \centrist."
26Note that () is the eigenvalue of T() corresponding to the eigenvalue  of T, and the modulus of the complex
number a + ib is ka + ibk 
p
a2 + b2. Also, we dene f0() in the obvious way, by taking the limit: f0() 
lim!0 f() = exp[Re()   1], where Re() denotes the real part of the complex number .
27In fact, genericity ensures not only the lack of ties, but also that the diagonalizability of the matrix T.






where i = a+bV c
2 for some constants a and b > 0, and D` denotes the `th component of the vector
V r
2 x0.
This theorem states that in the long run, any given agent's position on one issue is perfectly
correlated with his positions on all other issues. This is because agent i's long-run dierence of
opinion on issue ` depends on i only through the scalar i, which is the same across all issues.
This scalar i can naturally be interpreted as the long-run position of agent i on a unidimensional
spectrum of disagreement. As Theorem 4 shows, agents' positions are determined by the second
column eigenvector of T, V c
2 . The line along which agents disagree is, in turn, given by the vector
D  (D1;:::;DL) = V r
2 x0, which is determined by the second row eigenvector of T, together with
agents' initial beliefs.
To illustrate Theorem 4, consider again Example 1. In this example, 2 = 1=3, and so the second








. Thus, in the long run
and on every issue, agent 1 is at one extreme, agents 3 and 4 at the other, and agent 2 in between
and closer to agents 3 and 4. This result follows from the listening dynamics, and is independent of
initial beliefs and the number of dimensions.
The second row eigenvector of T in Example 1 is V r
2 = (0;1;0; 1). This implies that the long-
run dierences of opinion are fully determined by the initial dierence of opinion between agents 2
and 4.28 This can be seen in Figure 2 by the fact that the line along which beliefs ultimately lie
(t = 16) has the same slope as the line between agents 2 and 4 initially (t = 1). Again, this result is
independent of initial beliefs and the number of dimensions.29
A technical intuition for our unidimensionality result is as follows. Generically, the listening
matrix T has the diagonal decomposition,
T = V cAV r; (7)
where A is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of T, and V c and V r are the matrices of the column
28 In fact, the vector V
r
2 x0 can always be interpreted as a dierence between weighted averages of initial beliefs of two






2 can be normalized so that the positive and negative elements each sum to 1.
29A more general illustration of the unidimensionality result can be found on the website
http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/demarzo/papers/persuasion.xls. This website provides an Excel macro
that in each application randomly locates ten agents in geographic neighborhoods (which dene the listening structure
as in Section IV), and independent of location also randomly assigns two-dimensional beliefs. The application then
animates the evolution of dierences of opinion, demonstrating the convergence to a line for any initial beliefs and
neighborhood network.
15and row eigenvectors, respectively. Thus,
Ttx0












We can interpret this as follows. After t rounds of updating, the vector of agents' beliefs on any issue
` can be represented as a linear combination of the column eigenvectors of T, where the coecient
of the nth eigenvector is initially given by V r
nx0
`, and then declines geometrically according to the
nth eigenvalue. (For simplicity, we are assuming here that t = 1 for all t.) The term V r
nx0
` maps
the agents' initial beliefs into the long-run consensus beliefs wx0
`, for n = 1 (since V r
1 = w), and into
\dierences of opinion," for n > 1 (by Footnote 28). Thus, in the long run, since t
n ! 0 for n > 1,
and V c
1 = (1;:::;1)0, the dierences of opinion disappear and beliefs converge to wx0
`. However, the
dierences of opinion corresponding to the second largest eigenvalue (V r
2 x0
`) persist the longest, with
agents' relative positions given by V c
2 .
It is worth remarking on the relationship between our unidimensionality result and persuasion.
Unidimensionality obtains in Theorem 4 due to the linearity of updating, i.e., due to the repeated
application of a combination of T and I to prior beliefs. In words, unidimensionality depends on
the Markovian structure of updating (whereby old information does not aect updating in a given
period save through the formation of prior beliefs entering into that period), and the constant
relative weights that an agent gives others over time. But this is precisely what our assumption of
persuasion entails: agents continue to treat reports from dierent individuals as independent from old
information (thereby justifying Markovian updating), and in a constant manner over time (yielding
constant relative weights).30
Theorem 4 relies on the second eigenvalue being real. It is possible that the second eigenvalue
is complex. This occurs in the case when the listening structure is dominated by an one-way cycle
(for example, agents are on a circle and listen to their clockwise neighbors). An analogous result
to Theorem 4 can be derived for the complex case. There, it can be shown that agents' relative
positions cycle prior to convergence, with the periodicity of the cycle determined by the angle of 2
in the complex plane.31 By generating random listening structures, we have found numerically that
the case where the second eigenvalue is complex is relatively rare. Moreover, in Section IV we will
show that for a broad and important class of listening structures all eigenvalues are real.
III.C Speed of Convergence
In the previous subsections we have demonstrated the convergence of agents' beliefs and dierences
of opinion. In this subsection, we briey discuss the speed of convergence. Not surprisingly, the
30Other updating processes generally will not yield long-run linear dierences of opinion. We have already seen in
Theorem 3 that if agents know the network and are fully rational, they converge in a nite number of rounds to the
same beliefs, and therefore there are no long-run dierences of opinion. There is little reason to believe that other,
more general, updating processes would yield long-run linear dierences of opinion.
31This result is available upon request. For example, if agents are on a circle and listen to their clockwise neighbors,
and if t = 1, then the cycle has period length 2=arctan(Im(2)=Re(2)) = 2N. Since each agent moves half-way
towards his neighbor each period, relative positions will cycle after 2N communication rounds.
16convergence rate is governed by the size of the eigenvalues of the listening matrix T, as the following
theorem makes explicit.
Theorem 5 Consider a listening matrix T with eigenvalues n ordered according to f. Then
kxt















The theorem makes clear that the rate of convergence of beliefs is governed by the size of the
second eigenvalue of T, whereas the rate of convergence of dierences of opinion is governed by the
relative size of the second and third eigenvalues. Thus, for example, if we compare two listening
matrices, T and ^ T with associated eigenvalues 2 and ^ 2 such that f(2) < f(^ 2), then beliefs
will converge more quickly under T than under ^ T.
III.D Generalizations of the Model
There are a number of possible generalizations of the basic model and the results. Rather than fully
elaborate on them here, we describe them briey and refer interested readers to the Appendix.
Individuals versus Groups: In the basic model we have interpreted each agent as an individual.
In many applications, it might be useful to consider groups of similar agents, all sharing the same
listening weights and position in the social network. (This is especially useful when trying to model
the \macro" structure of a social network; e.g., we might identify colleagues at the same research
institute as one group, and focus on the links between institutes.) We show in Appendix VII.A
that the basic model can be extended in this fashion. In this case, we interpret t
ij as the aggregate
precision individuals in group i perceive for group j. In the special case where individuals have equal
precision, we can therefore interpret t
ij as proportional to the size of group j.
Random Matching: We also extend the model in Appendix VII.A to the case in which individuals
are randomly matched with other individuals in the population each period. In this case, we show
that expected beliefs can also be described by equation (5), where we now interpret t
ij as the
probability that i listens to j each period.
A Graphical Characterization of Inuence Weights: Here we demonstrated that the inuence
weights w can be interpreted as the stationary distribution associated with the listening matrix T.
We show in Appendix VII.B an alternative method of characterizing the inuence weights using
directly the graph of the listening structure and \counting trees" consistent with this structure for
which each agent is at the root. The advantage of this approach is it relates social inuence directly
to aspects of an individual's position in the directed graph.
Non-Strongly Connected Listening Structures: Our analysis has concentrated on the case in
which the set of agents is strongly connected. In Appendix VII.C, we consider the case in which some
groups of agents are isolated and do not listen to agents outside their own group. We show that the
beliefs of agents in isolated groups converge, as in Section III.A, but with dierent isolated groups
converging to dierent beliefs. The beliefs of agents who are not in an isolated group lie within the
17convex hull of the beliefs of the isolated groups. This setting may be applicable to situations where
there are isolated groups of \extremists," with the general population distributed in between.
IV Bilateral Communication and Neighborhoods
One natural listening structure in many applications is for individuals to listen to their neighbors.
Depending on the application, neighborhoods can be dened by one of many criteria, such as ge-
ographical proximity, cultural proximity, social interaction, etc. In such settings, it is natural to
assume that communication is bilateral: if an agent i listens to an agent j (because j is i's neighbor),
then j also listens to i (because, by symmetry, i is j's neighbor), i.e., qij = qji for all i;j.
We consider two natural cases regarding agents' assessments of precision. First, the common
precision case, where agents agree on their assessments, i.e., 0
ij = 0
j for all i;j. (Agents' common
assessments may further coincide with the correct precision, in which case 0
j = ^ 0
j for all j.) Second,
the symmetric precision case, where agents can disagree on their assessments, but assessments are
symmetric in the sense that i's assessment of j's precision equals j's assessment of i's precision, i.e.,
0
ij = 0
ji for all i;j. The symmetric precision case corresponds to settings where agents use dierent
\models" of the world, and view those who share their model as having more accurate information.
For example, traders relying on technical analysis (chartists) may attribute a high precision 0 to
other chartists and a low precision 0 to traders analyzing fundamentals. Conversely, fundamentals
analysts may attribute the high precision 0 to other such analysts and the low precision 0 to
chartists.32 We should note that both the common and the symmetric precision cases include the
equal precision case (0
ij = 0 for all i;j) as a special case.
IV.A Social Inuence in Neighborhoods
Under bilateral communication, the social inuence weights take a particularly simple form.
Theorem 6 Suppose communication is bilateral. Then:
a. If 0
ij = 0


























Thus, in the equal precision case, agent i's relative social inuence is simply given by the cardi-
nality of i's listening set, i.e., the number of i's neighbors (where i is also counted as a neighbor).
Consequently, agent i is inuential if he has many neighbors. Intuitively, those with many neighbors
are listened to by many agents. Somewhat surprisingly, however, i's inuence only depends on the
32The symmetric precision case also corresponds to the random matching model, sketched in Subsection III.D.
Indeed, in that model, the assessments of precision are the matching probabilities, which are by denition symmetric.
18number of his neighbors, and not on these neighbors' own inuence. This is because there are two
eects which exactly oset. On one hand, being listened to by an inuential neighbor j, tends to
increase i's inuence, holding the weight that j gives to i constant. On the other hand, if j is inu-
ential (i.e., has many neighbors), then he listens to many agents, lessening the weight given to any
one neighbor, such as i.
More generally, in the common precision case, agent i's relative social inuence is given by the
product of i's precision, times the aggregate precision of i's neighbors. Accuracy increases i's inuence
since i is then given more weight by his neighbors. Similarly, having accurate neighbors increases i's
inuence since accurate neighbors are also more inuential. In the symmetric precision case, agent
i's relative social inuence is given by the sum across neighbors of the precision these neighbors
attribute to i.
An interesting feature of Theorem 6 is that an agent's relative social inuence depends only
on simple characteristics of the agent's local neighborhood (such as the number and precision of the
agent's direct neighbors, and the precision these direct neighbors assign to the agent). This contrasts
with the general case where social inuence can depend in a rather complex manner on the entire
listening structure.
IV.B Long-Run Dierences of Opinion in Neighborhoods
We next turn to agents' long-run dierences in opinion. Bilateral communication imposes strong
restrictions on the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of T.
Theorem 7 Suppose communication is bilateral, and 0
ij = 0
j for all i;j (common precision) or
0
ij = 0
ji for all i;j (symmetric precision). Then the listening matrix T is diagonalizable, and all
its eigenvalues are real. Furthermore, if (v1;:::;vN)0 is a column eigenvector of T, then a row
eigenvector corresponding to the same eigenvalue is (w1v1;:::;wNvN).33
Since the eigenvalues of T are real, we can apply Theorem 4. Therefore, in the long run, agents
hold the same relative positions on all issues. The agents holding the most extreme positions are
those corresponding to the extreme components of the second column eigenvector. On the other
hand, the agents whose initial beliefs contribute the most to the long-run disagreement are those
corresponding to the extreme components of the second row eigenvector. It is natural to think that
such agents will be those who have extreme views, and those who are inuential. Theorem 7 shows
that these two eects interact in a very simple manner. In particular, the component of the second
row eigenvector associated with each agent is simply the product of the corresponding component of
the second column eigenvector and the agent's social inuence wi.
33The results in Theorem 7 have a counterpart in the theory of Markov chains. Under bilateral communication,
and common or symmetric precision, the Markov chain associated to T is reversible, i.e., satises the detailed balance
equations: wiTij = wjTji for all i;j. In our context, the detailed balance equations mean that i's social inuence
times the direct inuence of j on i (which can be interpreted as the social inuence j obtains \through" i) is equal to
j's social inuence times the direct inuence of i on j. The results in Theorem 7 follow from this reversibility property.
19To illustrate our results, we consider an example where agents are located on a two-dimensional
space, listen to those within a given radius around themselves, and have equal precision. In Figure
3 we plot the two-dimensional \map" corresponding to the listening structure, indicating each agent
by a node, and each pair of agents that listen to each other by an edge. Note that the inuence
weights are proportional to the size of each agent's listening set (number of edges plus the implicit
edge from an agent to himself), as in Theorem 6. Note also that the long-run positions, V c
i2, are
correlated across neighbors, and the agents with the most extreme long-run views are far apart from
each other in the graph.
IV.C A Special Case { Agents Located on a Line
A simple and particularly appealing listening structure involving bilateral communication is when
agents are located on a line and listen to their immediate neighbors. In this subsection we obtain
specic results for this listening structure. For simplicity, we take all agents to have equal precision.
We label the agent located in the middle of the line as agent 0, and the agent located i positions to
the right (left) as agent i (agent  i). In addition, we set N = 2M + 1, so that the agents at the
extremes are M and  M.
A word of caution is in order here, as there are two distinct orderings of agents that are relevant
in this subsection. As elsewhere in this paper, we take the listening structure to be xed, and
consequently agents' labels (i.e., their positions on the line which determines the listening structure)
are xed. We make no assumption here about the relationship between this \geographical" ordering
and agents' initial beliefs. Thus, neighbors can start with very dierent beliefs. Rather strikingly,
we show in Theorem 8 that the geographical ordering, and not initial beliefs, entirely determines the
ordering of beliefs in the long run.
Theorem 8 Suppose that agents are located on a line, and listen to their immediate neighbors (and
themselves). Suppose also 0
















2M+1 < 2 < 
2M.) Then, the i'th component of V c
2 is proportional to vc
i = sin[i2],
while the i'th component of V r
2 is proportional to vr
i, dened by vr
i = 2sin[i2] for i = M, and
vr
i = 3sin[i2] otherwise. When M  2, the extreme values of vr
i are for i = (M   1).
Since 2 < 
2M, vc
i is increasing in i, and thus agents' geographical ordering does indeed coincide
with the ordering of their positions in the long run. Figure 4 plots vc
i as a function of i. In addition
to monotonicity, this gure indicates that the distance between agents' long-run positions is smallest
at the extremes and largest at the center. In other words, the distance between agents M and M  1
is smaller than between M   1 and M   2, which is smaller than between M   2 and M   3, and
so on. Intuitively, agents at the extremes are \pulled" only in one direction, and thus their beliefs
20become close to those of their neighbors quite quickly. Likewise, agents close to the extremes are
pulled mainly in one direction, since the beliefs of their more extreme neighbors are close to theirs.
The result that distance is smallest at the extremes can also be expressed in terms of the density
of agents holding a given position. We plot this density in Figure 5. As shown in the gure, the
density is largest at the extremes, since agents' positions are the closest. Thus, independent of the
initial density, the long-run density exhibits a form of polarization.
According to Theorem 8, the agents whose dierence in initial beliefs matters the most for long-
run disagreement are M   1 and  (M   1), i.e., the agents next closest to the extremes. This is
because these agents are not only close to the extremes, but are also the only agents that those at
the extremes are listening to.
Finally, it is interesting to examine the speed of convergence in this example. Recall from Theorem
5 that the speed at which beliefs converge to consensus is of order f(2)
Pt 1
s=0 s, while the speed at
which dierences of opinion become unidimensional is of order (f(3)=f(2))
Pt 1
s=0 s, where 2
and 3 are the second and third largest eigenvalues of T. For large M, these eigenvalues are given
by
2  1  
2
12M2 and 3  1  
2
3M2; (8)
respectively.34 Note also that for  close to zero, f(1   k)  [f(1   )]k. Together with (8),
this implies that the speed of convergence of both beliefs and dierences of opinion decreases with
M2; that is, doubling the length of the line causes the speed of convergence to slow by a factor of
4. Similarly, we can also compare the relative speeds of convergence. Because f(3)=f(2) 
[f(2)]3, the speed at which dierences of opinion become unidimensional is three times faster than
the speed at which beliefs converge to consensus.
V Additional Applications
In this section, we explore more informally a number of other applications of our model. For con-
creteness, we pick and discuss in detail one area where persuasive activity is particularly notable:
that of political discourse. We then briey discuss applications to a number of other areas.
One important caveat is in order here. Our model presumes that agents report their information
truthfully. This assumption might describe well communication between friends and colleagues
sharing opinions, and some of the implications discussed below are consistent with this setting. For
some other implications, however (e.g., propaganda, political spin, political campaigns, etc.), this
assumption is not reasonable, as persuaders might have a lot to gain from inuencing listeners,
and therefore from misreporting their information. The extent of misreporting might, of course, be
limited by reputational or legal concerns (e.g., politicians might be punished by the electorate for
telling lies, false advertising might be restricted, etc.).
Persuasion bias could have an eect even in settings with misreporting. For example, listeners
34This follows from equations (23) and (28), by setting m = 1 and m = 2.
21could be fully aware that only arguments in support of an issue will be presented. However, if they
do not adjust for repetitions, they could be swayed by the number of arguments, not fully accounting
for the fact that similar arguments are repeated.
In addition to misreporting, our notion of persuasion bias implies that strategic persuaders would
have an incentive to repeat their information frequently, especially to those that many others listen
to. This seems very realistic: it is hard to think of a setting where agents who would benet from
persuasion do not behave in this manner. As just one notable example, candidates for public oce
campaign for months or even years, with a message that can be clearly communicated in hours.35
V.A Political Discourse
We begin by noting that our notion of persuasion bias yields an immediate explanation for several
widespread political phenomena such as propaganda, censorship, political spin, and the importance
of air-time. We then discuss a number of deeper implications and novel empirical predictions that
follow from applying our analysis and results to various political science questions.
Propaganda, Censorship, Political Spin and Air-Time: Propaganda and censorship seem to
depend critically on the notion that repeated exposures to a particular message have a cumulative
eect on a listener over time. Indeed, one dening feature of propaganda campaigns is the frequent
repetition of a message { i.e., the intent is for listeners to hear the message many times. Similarly,
censorship often seems motivated by the notion that frequent exposure to an opposing opinion will
sway beliefs in that direction, and therefore such exposure should be restricted.36
The phenomenon of political spin seems closely related. Political strategists often seem to be
concerned with pushing a common message repeatedly. Political spokespersons coordinate on com-
mon lists of \talking-points" which they repeat in the media, seemingly under the belief that such
repetition will give their viewpoint the most eective \spin."37
More generally, \air-time" is considered to have an important eect on beliefs. For example, a
political debate without equal time for both sides, or a criminal trial in which the defense was given
less time to present its case than the prosecution, would generally be considered biased and unfair.
Indeed, common concerns about inequitable political fund-raising seem to be motivated by concerns
35The interaction between strategic behavior and persuasion bias yields a number of interesting questions for future
research. One question, for example, concerns the competition between strategic political parties when voters are
subject to persuasion bias.
36A distinction should be drawn here between the censor who believes the censored opinions are inaccurate, and
the censor who believes they are accurate (but personally undesirable). Without a notion of persuasion, it is hard to
understand censorship of the former type. Indeed, absent persuasion bias, arguments for incorrect opinions should, on
average, lessen the appeal of these opinions. While, in contrast, persuasion bias is not necessary to understand the
activity of a censor trying to silence opinions he believes are in fact correct, it seems clear that many censors do believe
the views they are silencing are harmful and incorrect.
37Closely related are social psychology literatures on the ecacy of priming and agenda setting through the media
in political campaigns. (See, for example, Iyengar and Kinder [1987] on priming and Cohen [1963] and Ehbring,
Goldenberg and Miller [1980] on agenda setting.) Related to our model, Huckfeldt and Sprague [1995] nd evidence
that the specic form of social networks play an important role in inuencing political beliefs. In particular, they nd
that frequent political conversation partners have an important eect on an individual's political beliefs after controlling
for natural demographic and personal characteristics.
22about the unequal air-time that the funds will subsequently provide. Note that this appears to be
true even when the message is simple, and could seemingly be conveyed rather quickly, and when it
has already been widely heard by the electorate. Here as well, such concerns can be easily understood
under the presumption that repetition unduly aects beliefs.
Unidimensional Opinions: Perhaps the most notable implication of our model for political science
is that according to Theorem 4, long-run dierences of opinion should be \unidimensional."38 In
particular, representing an agent's beliefs over L issues by a point in RL, Theorem 4 indicates that
after \enough" updating, the beliefs of all agents will line up along a single line. Consequently, an
agent's beliefs over all issues will be characterizable by a single scalar measure; for example, how far
to the \left" or \right" he is. It is worth emphasizing that unidimensional long-run beliefs is a very
general result of our model that follows without imposing any unidimensionality on the underlying
listening structure or initial beliefs: i.e., it follows generally for any multidimensional initial beliefs
and any strongly connected listening structure.39 We are unaware of any other model of political
belief formation or dynamics where unidimensional beliefs follow so generally.40
Our linearity result is especially notable given the attention the unidimensionality issue has
received in political science. For example, a large literature has examined whether the voting records
of Congress and Senate members can be explained by a unidimensional \liberal-conservative" model,
and has found strong support for such a model.41 The unidimensionality assumption is also prominent
in theoretical political-science modeling. For example, the standard median-voter result relies on
unidimensional political views, and does not easily generalize to multiple dimensions.42
One reason, undoubtedly, that unidimensional opinions have received so much attention in the
political science literature is that such characterizations appear to be the norm in informal political
discourse as well. That is, individuals' political views are typically depicted by the extent to which
they are liberal or conservative. And while such unidimensional depictions might, at times, be a
matter of convenience or simplicity, they frequently convey quite well what the individual believes
38We believe the focus on long-run dierences of opinion, rather than on convergent beliefs, is more appropriate for
political applications, in light of our discussion in footnote 23 above. That is, lacking a natural metric to measure
the distance between political beliefs, or to compare across dierent issues, makes empirical tests of convergence
problematic. In contrast, however, our unidimensionality result yields ordinal predictions about individuals' beliefs
(i.e., the order of individuals will be identical across issues), which are testable without any measurement of distance
between beliefs.
39This is, of course, subject to the second eigenvalue being real and not identical to the third. In many applica-
tions (such as settings where communication is bilateral) the second eigenvalue is real. Additionally, ties among real
eigenvalues are non-generic.
40One theoretical model that purports to obtain unidimensional beliefs is Spector's [2000] cheap-talk model of opinion
formation. However, with only two \types" in his model, beliefs by denition must be linear across the two types.
Rather, he nds that the ultimate dierence of opinion between his two types will be over a single issue. By contrast,
our result is that the beliefs of many dierent agents will all line up along a line, where the line will generally be
characterized by disagreements over all issues.
41See, for example, Converse [1964], Poole and Rosenthal [1991,1997], and the references therein.
42For the median voter result see, for example, Varian [1992], and for the multidimensional case see Caplin and
Nalebu [1991]. We should note that much of the political science literature has focused on preferences rather than
beliefs. While we acknowledge this dierence, and recognize that preferences may be more fundamental to political
actions than beliefs, there are times when they will coincide. For example, if preferences over outcomes are similar,
preferences over policies will coincide with beliefs about the outcomes that policies will induce.
23about a wide range of issues.
Grouping of Opinions: An alternative explanation for unidimensional opinions is that all issues
are naturally related (or share important common components), and therefore the issue space is
eectively unidimensional. A comparison of this view with our notion, that unidimensional beliefs
follow from the particular manner of social updating, reveals several implications that our model has
for the grouping of opinions.
First, in contrast with the alternative view, our model suggests that many dierent opinions on
unrelated issues will be grouped together in a common set of opinions. Consider for example the
following set of contentious issues in American politics: free trade, abortion, ag-burning, the death
penalty, school vouchers, and environmental regulation. To us, at least, debate on these issues seem
to involve very dierent concepts and arguments. Nonetheless, it seems striking how far one can
go in describing many individuals' beliefs across all these issues with a simple liberal/conservative
characterization.
Furthermore, the two alternative explanations of unidimensional beliefs yield dierent implica-
tions for the consistency of groupings of opinions. If opinions are unidimensional because issues are
inherently related, the set of opinions grouped together and associated with conservatives or liberals
should be consistent over time and location. By contrast, under persuasion bias, the set of opin-
ions grouped together will depend on the initial beliefs and the listening structure. Thus, changes
in initial beliefs, or in the social network along which people communicate, could lead to dierent
groupings of opinions. Notably, opinions that are considered \conservative" in some countries and at
certain times are considered \liberal" elsewhere and at dierent times. For example, free trade has
passed from a liberal to a conservative opinion in the United States over the last century. Similarly,
favoring free trade is considered a liberal opinions in some countries (such as China and Vietnam),
while in contrast, it is considered conservative in others (such as the United States and Mexico).43
Notably, such grouping of opinions yields a natural explanation for the existence and stability
of political parties. Indeed, if individuals' opinions were instead independent across dierent issues,
it is unclear how (or why) parties would stake out a position on all important issues. Furthermore,
one would expect to see individuals varying their allegiance regularly from party to party, depending
on the issue of the day. Indeed, the presence of individuals with similar beliefs across a wide range
of issues, seems a critical condition for the existence of political parties. Persuasion bias, in turn,
would then give individuals a motivation to support such parties, which could serve as an ecient
mechanism for repeating opinions so as to convince others.44
43This is not simply a matter of dierent political labelings in dierent countries, but rather, indicative of dierent
sets of opinions that seem to be grouped together. For example, in all these countries, being in favor of a strong military
is considered a conservative opinion. Thus, in China and Vietnam, those in favor of a strong military are likely to be
opposed to free trade, while in the United States and Mexico, the converse is likely to be true.
44An alternative explanation for the grouping of opinions is that individuals all choose to identify with the views
of a combination of pre-existing political parties. It is not clear why individuals would do so, however, absent some
notion of persuasion. Furthermore, such an explanation would not predict unidimensional beliefs across a population
if there was more than two political parties, nor would it explain why many individuals have views more extreme on
some issues than the positions of the major parties in their country.
24Demographic Explanations of Political Opinion: Our results on neighborhood structures in
Section IV imply that agents who are \near" one another in a social network are likely to acquire
similar beliefs over time. Thus, to the extent that certain demographic characteristics such as age,
race, wealth, profession, neighborhood, religion, etc., aect social interactions, we would expect these
same characteristics to determine where on the political line one's views are located. Conversely,
demographic characteristics that are not an important basis for social interaction would not be related
to political beliefs. Insofar as the demographic characteristics that determine social interaction
vary across places and time, this observation yields testable variation in determinants of political
beliefs. For example, our model predicts that race or religion would play a larger role in determining
someone's political beliefs in less racially or religiously integrated places and/or times.
Closed Groups: If there are groups of individuals who conne themselves to communicating with
one another, their beliefs will converge faster to a common group belief, which will be very hard for
outsiders to impact. Thus, political opinions should be more uniform in countries with fewer ties to
outsiders than in countries where visitors are common. Similarly, opinions should be more uniform
in small isolated towns than in cities. Or as an extreme example, the model would predict a high
degree of conformity among closed religious communities and among religious cults.45 Indeed, typical
depictions of brainwashing techniques employed by cults { frequent bombardment with the group
message, the forced severing of ties with outsiders, repeated group reinforcement of the message over
time { can be seen as a straightforward manifestation of our notion of persuasion.
Unidimensional Views and Media Coverage: Since the speed of convergence depends on the
frequency of communication, unidimensionality of beliefs should be more pronounced for important
or timely issues that are discussed more than for trivial or non-topical issues. It seems reasonable
to believe that media attention is likely to be related to the amount an issue is discussed.46 Conse-
quently, a novel prediction of our model is that the degree of media attention that an issue receives
will be positively related to the degree that individuals' views on the issue are predictable from their
general political convictions. Or, equivalently, media attention to topics will be associated with more
polarization along standard party lines.
Summary: Our model yields a number of novel political science predictions. It predicts unidimen-
sional long-run beliefs, with adherence to this pattern being greater for issues that are frequently
discussed (which we posit is related to media coverage). Groupings of political issues along the line
that denes unidimensional beliefs will depend on the social network, and consequently, is likely
to be more similar across times and places with similar social interaction. \Social neighbors" will
evolve to have similar views; and consequently, the importance of dierent demographic factors in
explaining individuals' political orientation will be related to the importance of such factors in de-
termining social interaction. Insofar as the latter is likely to vary over time and place, the model
45An example in line with this interpretation is the voting of certain Hasidic Jewish communities in New York.
For example, one such community, New Square, voted 1400-12 in favor of Hillary Clinton (the Democrat) over Rick
Lazio (the Republican) in the 2000 Senate race. Nor can this be attributable to a natural association of Hasidism
with Democrats. On the contrary, other Hasidic communities strongly favored Lazio, and Alphonse D'Amato (the
Republican) carried New Square by a similar margin in 1998 over Charles Schumer (the Democrat).
46This might be true either because the media can create public interest, or because it reects public interest.
25predicts demographic factors will vary in their importance in determining political beliefs. Addi-
tionally, communities that interact less with outsiders are likely to have homogeneous views that are
hard for outsiders to change.
V.B Other Applications - A Brief Overview
Here we briey discuss applications to two other settings: court trials and marketing.
Court Trials: Persuasion bias justies the common notion that air-time is important in a trial.
Trials where only one side gets to present evidence, or where one side has a far greater opportunity
to speak, are universally condemned as unfair. Additionally, our model predicts that disagreements
within a deliberative body (such as a jury) about dierent pieces of evidence or dierent arguments
are likely to be unidimensional after sucient deliberations, but not beforehand. Thus, the members
of a jury are likely to ultimately separate into two camps - \left" and \right" of the consensus - with
those in the same camp being on the same side on the interpretation of all pieces of evidence.47
Marketing: Persuasion bias seems central to marketing activity. In particular, many marketing
campaigns seem to be designed with the idea that repeated exposures to an advertisement will
have a cumulative eect on consumer preferences. Additionally, our model predicts that consumer
preferences should exhibit closer adherence to unidimensionality over goods that are discussed more
frequently. Thus, if some goods (\social goods") are more enjoyable to discuss than others (e.g.,
discussing music, restaurants, and fashion is more enjoyable than discussing insurance, cleaning
products, and hardware), one should observe more predictability in individuals' tastes for these
goods. Additionally, the more related a demographic factor is to social networks, the more it should
predict tastes; and such demographic factors should predict tastes better for social goods. For
example, an individual's social circle is likely to be a better predictor of his taste in music and
restaurants than his taste in insurance or cleaning products.
VI Conclusion
We propose a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to
persuasion bias. Specically, individuals fail to adjust for possible repetitions of (or common sources
in) information they receive. Persuasion bias can be viewed as a simple, boundedly rational heuristic,
arising from the complexity of recounting the source of all the information that has played a role in
forming one's beliefs. We argue that it provides an explanation for several important phenomena,
such as the eectiveness of air-time, propaganda, censorship, political spin, marketing, etc. These
phenomena suggest that persuasion bias is ubiquitous, and plays an important role in the process of
social opinion formation.
47In line with our notion of persuasion, juries frequently deliberate for an extended period before reaching a consensus.
Judges often instruct deadlocked juries to continue deliberating, despite the absence of new information, and such juries
frequently do reach a consensus.
26We explore the implications of persuasion bias in a model where individuals communicate accord-
ing to a social network. We show that persuasion bias implies the phenomenon of social inuence,
whereby an individual's inuence on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how
well-connected the individual is in the network. Persuasion bias implies the additional phenomenon of
unidimensional opinions, because individuals' opinions over a multidimensional set of issues converge
to a single \left-right" spectrum.
We apply our model to several natural settings, including neighborhoods with bilateral commu-
nication, political discourse, court trials, and marketing. We argue that our model provides a useful
way for thinking about opinion formation in these settings, and has a number of novel empirically
testable predictions. For example, our model predicts that political beliefs should be unidimensional,
with conformity to this pattern being greater for issues that receive media coverage. Additionally,
the importance of dierent demographic factors in explaining political beliefs should depend on the
role these factors play in social interaction.
An important extension of our model is to endogenize the listening structure. In some settings,
for example, agents might believe that those expressing similar opinions to their own are more
accurate, and might choose to listen only to such individuals. In a companion paper (DeMarzo,
Vayanos, and Zwiebel [2001]), we consider persuasion and endogenous listening in an asset market
setting. Agents communicate information about an asset across a social network, and trade on their
information. Within any \trading episode" we hold the network xed, but across trading episodes
we allow agents to change who they listen to based on the trading prots they realize. Among our
results, we characterize which listening structures are \stable" in the sense that no agent would
choose to alter the agents he listens to given the listening choices of other agents. We nd that
provided that there is a sucient amount of updating, stable listening structures generally take the
form where all agents listen to the same \expert," or the same set of \experts." Furthermore, the
experts listened to need not be the ones with the best information, and consequently, inuence can
be self-perpetuating independently of accuracy. We believe the framework provided by this model is
well suited for other applications where the listening structure might be endogenous.
Finally, our model of persuasion is well suited for experimental testing. The model yields a
number of unique predictions relating the listening structure to dynamic properties of beliefs, e.g.,
to social inuence weights and agents' positions on the line of long-run disagreement. Although
the precise listening structure might be dicult to measure in many empirical settings, it would be
easy to create and modify in an experimental setting. In such a setting it would be possible to test
many of the specic predictions of our model, as well as more \general" predictions, such as whether
beliefs lie along a line in the long run. It is worth noting that the quantitative nature of our model's
predictions goes well beyond that of many behavioral models. Consequently, we believe that testing
some of these predictions experimentally would be quite interesting and would provide for a strong
test of our framework. But perhaps this is because we have listened to one another too much, and
have therefore been unduly persuaded about the merits of our ideas.
27Appendix
VII Generalizations of the Model
VII.A Groups and Random Matching
To model groups, suppose that there exists a partition P of the set N of agents, such that for all
I 2 P, and all i;i0 2 I, j 2 N, we have
a. The agents in I employ equal listening weights: Tij = Ti0j,
b. The agents in I receive equal relative listening weight: either (qji = qji0 = 0) or (qji = qji0 = 1
and Tji=Tji0 is independent of j).
Then we can aggregate each group I 2 P into a single representative agent as follows. Dene a new
listening matrix by TIJ =
P
j2J Tij for I;J 2 P, and i 2 I arbitrary by condition (a) above. Also










for j 2 N arbitrary (such that qji = 1) by condition (b) above. Then it is easy to check that the
updating rule (3) holds for the representative agents as well. Moreover, xt
i = xt
I for i 2 I and t  1;
that is, after one round of updating all agents within any given group have the same beliefs.
The importance of this observation is that it allows us to reinterpret any agent j in a listening
structure as representing a group of agents rather than one individual agent. The relationship
TIJ =
P
j2J Tij then is equivalent to interpreting 0
ij as the aggregate perceived precision of the
group of agents represented by j. In the special case where individual group members have equal
precision, this implies that 0
ij is proportional to the size of the group represented by j.
It is also possible to reinterpret our model in a setting where communication occurs through a
random matching process. Suppose that each agent i listens to only one agent j 2 S(i)nfig, chosen
at random. Let 0
ii be the relative precision that agent i believes his information has compared to










Denoting by pij the probability that i is matched with j, so that
P
j6=i qijpij = 1, we have
E[x1] = Tx0:
where T is the same matrix as in equation (2) but with pij = 0
ij. This means that in the random
matching model, the matrix T describes the evolution of expected beliefs, and the precisions can be
interpreted as the matching probabilities. To make the matching model deterministic, one could
further assume that each agent is a \type," consisting of a continuum of \identical" agents (as in
the group structure discussed above). Then, the uncertainty of the random matching process is
eliminated in the aggregate, and equation (3) describes the deterministic evolution of the average
beliefs of each type.
28VII.B A Graphical Characterization of Inuence Weights
The social inuence weights w can also be characterized in a way which is more directly related to the
underlying listening structure. This is done by using a \tree-counting" method. Dene a spanning
tree G as a directed graph connecting all agents in N, where every agent save for one has a unique
predecessor, there are no cycles, and one agent (the root) has no predecessors. The edge (i;j) 2 G





that is, the product of the direct inuence that ows from the root of the tree. Let Gi be the set
of spanning trees with agent i at the root and (G) > 0. Then, the social inuence weights can be
characterized as follows:










That is, the relative social inuence of agent i is given by summing over all spanning trees with i
at the root, the product of the direct inuence within each tree. Theorem 9 follows from a classic
result in Markov chain theory, sometimes referred to as the \Markov Chain Tree Formula."48 In the
special case of equal precision (0
ij = 0 for all i;j), Theorem 9 simplies as follows:
Corollary 2 Suppose the assumptions to Theorem 9 hold, and 0










That is, to determine the relative social inuence of agent i, we simply need to count the number
of spanning trees with i at the root and the property that each agent listens to his predecessor, and
multiply this by the number of agents that i listens to.
To illustrate the tree-counting method, consider the listening structure of Example 1. The vector
corresponding to the number of spanning trees is (8;5;2;1). (The spanning trees for agents 3 and
4 are shown in Figure 6.) The vector corresponding to the cardinality of an agent's listening set is
(2;3;4;3). Corollary 2 implies that the relative inuence weights are (16;15;8;3). These are equal
to the weights found in Subsection III.A, after normalization.
VII.C Nonstrongly Connected Listening Structures
Our analysis can be extended to general listening structures, where agents may not necessarily be
strongly connected. For a general listening structure, dene a bilateral relationship R on N by
i R j , fi;jg is strongly connected:
The relationship R is reexive, symmetric, and transitive. Therefore, it denes a partition of N into
equivalence classes. We denote this partition by P. The denition of R ensures that each element
of P is strongly connected.
48See, for example, Aldous and Fill [1999, Ch. 9] and the references therein.
29Suppose that for an element I 2 P, no agent in I listens to agents outside I. Then the dynamics
of beliefs of the agents in I can be studied in isolation. This motivates the following denition:
Denition 3 A set I 2 P is linked to J 2 P if there exists i 2 I and j 2 J such that j 2 S(i) (i.e.,
j inuences i). A set I 2 P is isolated if it is not linked to any J 6= I.
Consider an isolated set I 2 P. Since the dynamics of beliefs of the agents in I can be studied
in isolation, and since I is strongly connected, Theorem 1 applies. All agents in I converge to a
common belief, which is a weighted average of their initial beliefs. We denote the vector of initial
beliefs restricted to I by x0(I), and the social inuence weights by w(I).
Consider next a non-isolated set J 2 P. If J is linked to only one isolated set I, then all agents
in J will converge to the limit beliefs of the agents in I, since they keep being \persuaded" by those
agents. If, by contrast, J is linked to multiple isolated sets, then the agents in J will converge to a
point in the convex hull of the limit beliefs corresponding to the isolated sets. Dierent agents in J
may, however, converge to dierent points in the convex hull, because they may be giving dierent
weights to the agents in the isolated sets. Theorem 10 makes these intuitions precise:
Theorem 10 The collection I of isolated elements of P is nonempty, and each non-isolated element
of P is linked to at least one isolated element. Furthermore:
a. If I 2 I, then the beliefs of all agents in I converge to w(I)x0(I).
b. If J 2 PnI is linked to a unique I 2 I, then the beliefs of all agents in J converge to w(I)x0(I).
c. If J 2 PnI is linked to multiple I 2 I, then the beliefs of each agent in J converge to a point
in the interior of the convex hull of the beliefs w(I)x0(I), for all such I.
We illustrate Theorem 10 with the following example:
Example 2 Suppose that N = 5, S(1) = f1g; S(2) = f1;2;3g; S(3) = f2;3;4g; S(4) = S(5) =
f4;5g, and agents attribute equal precision to those they listen to. Then P = ff1g;f2;3g;f4;5gg,
and the sets f1g and f4;5g are isolated. The beliefs of agent 1 converge to x0
1, and the beliefs of
agents 4 and 5 converge to (x0
4 + x0
5)=2. Furthermore, for the non-isolated set f2;3g, beliefs do not




those of agent 3 converge to (1=3)x0
1 + (1=3)x0
4 + (1=3)x0
5. Agent 2 ends up with more weight on
agent 1's initial beliefs than agent 3 does, since agent 2 listens directly to agent 1 while agent 3 does
not. Conversely, agent 3 listens directly to an agent in the isolated set f4;5g (in particular, agent
4) while agent 2 does not, and therefore ends up with more weight than agent 2 on agents' 4 and 5
initial beliefs.
VIII Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: The matrix T is the transition matrix of a nite, irreducible, and aperiodic
Markov chain. It is well known (see, for example, Aldous and Fill [1999, Ch. 2] and the references
therein) that (i) such a Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution, i.e., a unique probability
distribution w satisfying wT = w, (ii) wi > 0 for any state i, and (iii) starting from any state i, the
probability of being in state j at date t, converges to wj as t ! 1. Property (iii) implies that the
matrix Tt converges to a limit T1, each row of which is equal to w.
30To prove the Theorem, it remains to show that the matrix
Qt 1
s=0 T(s) converges to T1. Dene
the random variable t to be equal to 1 with probability t and 0 otherwise. Assume also that t












By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, if
P1
t=0 t = 1, then
Pr(t = 1 innitely often) = Pr(
1 X
t=0
t = 1) = 1:







s=0 s) = T1:
k
Proof of Corollary 1: The corollary follows immediately from wT = w. k
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equation (9) is equivalent to equation (6). k
Proof of Theorem 3: Given normality, a sucient statistic of agent i's information after commu-
nication round t is a weighted average vt
ix0 of all agents' signals, for some vector vt
i of weights. (This
can easily be proven by induction.)
Suppose that after communication round t, agents have not converged to the correct beliefs, i.e.,
there exists i such that vt
i diers from the vector ^ w of weights corresponding to the correct beliefs
^ x. Then, we will show that the beliefs of at least one agent must change in round t, i.e., there exists
i such that vt
i 6= vt 1
i . Suppose by contradiction that vt
i = vt 1
i for all i. Agent i does not change
his beliefs in round t only if vt 1
i x0 is a sucient statistic for fvt 1
j x0gj2S(i). The same applies to
the agents in S(i), and so on. Therefore, by strong connectedness, vt 1
i x0 is a sucient statistic for
fvt 1
j x0gj2N, and thus for fvt0
j x0gj2N;t0=0;:::;t 1. This implies that vt 1
i = ^ w for all i.
To show that agents converge to the correct beliefs in at most N2 rounds, we will show that each
agent can change his beliefs in at most N rounds. For this, we observe that if agent i changes his
31beliefs in round t, then vt
i must be linearly independent of fvt0
i gt0=0;:::;t 1. (Otherwise, vt
ix0 would
be known in t   1, and thus be equal to vt 1
i x0). The dimension of the subspace generated by
fvt0
i gt0=0;:::;t 1 can, however, increase only N times. k
Proof of Theorem 4: Generically, the matrix T is diagonalizable, and thus
T = V cAV r;
where A is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of T, and V c and V r are the matrices of the column
and row eigenvectors, respectively. Since an eigenvector of T corresponding to the eigenvalue  is
also an eigenvector of T() corresponding to the eigenvalue (), we have
T() = V cA()V r;















Noting that the matrix
Qt 1























and noting that for the eigenvalue 1 = 1, we have k1(t) = 1, V r
1 = w, and V c






























Multiplying equation (10) from the left by a weight vector ^ w (i.e., a vector such that ^ w  0 and PN
i=1 wi = 0), we have
^ wxt = ^ w1wx0 +
N X
n=2






kn(t) ^ wV c
nV r
nx0: (11)
32Multiplying equation (10) from the left by the row vector ei whose ith component is one and all








































Separating the terms corresponding to the second largest eigenvalue, dividing numerator and denom-
inator by k2(t), and setting D  V r































































































which goes to  1 from Assumption 1. Therefore, kn(t)=k2(t) goes to zero. k
Proof of Theorem 5: From the proof of Theorem 4, it follows that kxt
i   wx0k is of order kk2(t)k
33and kdt
i   d1





















The proof for kk2(t)k is similar. k
















































































































which obviously holds. k
Proof of Theorem 7: We rst show the detailed balance equations wiTij = wjTji for all i;j. In






















































Therefore, in both cases, the detailed balance equations hold.
Dening the diagonal matrix W, with i'th diagonal element
p
wi, we can write the detailed
balance equations as
W2T = (W2T)0 ) WTW 1 = (WTW 1)0:
Since the matrix WTW 1 is symmetric, it is diagonalizable with real eigenvalues and orthonormal
eigenvectors. This means that there exists a diagonal matrix A with real elements, and an invertible
matrix V such that V  1 = V 0, satisfying
WTW 1 = V  1AV:
This equation implies that
T = (V W) 1AV W;
i.e., the matrix T is diagonalizable with real eigenvalues, row eigenvector matrix
V r = V W;
and column eigenvector matrix
V c = (V r) 1 = W 1V 0:
Combining the last two equations, we get
V r = (WV c)0W = (V c)0W2:
Therefore, given a column eigenvector of T (i.e., a column of V c) the corresponding row eigenvector
(i.e., the corresponding row of V r) can be deduced as in the theorem. k
Proof of Theorem 8: Suppose that  is an eigenvalue of T, and v = (v M;:::;vM) a corresponding





















vM = vM: (18)
The solution to the dierence equation (17) is of the form
vi = 1(1)i + 2(2)i; (19)
where  M  i  M, 1 and 1 are two constants to be determined, and 1 and 2 are the roots of
35the characteristic equation
2 + (1   3) + 1 = 0: (20)
The constants 1 and 2 can be determined by plugging the solution (19) into equations (16) and
(18). Plugging into equation (16), we get
1(1) M [(1   2) + 1] + 2(2) M [(1   2) + 2] = 0; (21)
and plugging into equation (18), we get
1(1)M












Equations (21) and (22) form a 2  2 linear system in 1 and 2. For  to be an eigenvalue of T,
this system must have a non-zero solution, and thus its determinant has to be zero. This will imply
an equation which will determine .
To derive this equation, we assume that  2 ( 1=3;1]. (Under this assumption, we will obtain





we have 1 = ei and 2 = e i. The determinant of the system of (21) and (22) is
e 2iM
h




(1   2) + e i
i2
:
Setting this to zero, we get
e iM
h




(1   2) + e i
i
: (24)
The equation corresponding to the \plus" sign is
(1   2)sin[M] + sin[(M   1)] = 0; (25)
and can be simplied into




(1   cos)sin[M]   sincos[M] = 0
, sin[g()]sin[M]   cos[g()]cos[M] = 0
, cos[M + g()] = 0; (26)














Likewise, the equation corresponding to the \minus" sign is
(1   2)cos[M] + cos[(M   1)] = 0;
36and can be simplied into
sin[M + g()] = 0: (27)
Any solution  to equations (26) and (27) must satisfy




for some integer m. We will show that for each m = 0;:::;2M, equation (28) has a unique solution
in [0;), which we will denote by m+1. Given this solution, we can deduce an eigenvalue of T from
equation (23). The 2M + 1 = N eigenvalues so obtained are distinct since the solutions m+1 are
distinct and in [0;).
Setting




it is easy to check that G() is strictly increasing in  2 [0;), and that, given 0  m  2M,
G(0)  0 and G() > 0. Therefore, for each m = 0;:::;2M, equation G() = 0 has a unique
solution m+1 2 [0;).
For m = 0, G(0) = 0, and thus 1 = 0. For m = 1, G(=2) > 0, and thus 2 2 (0;=2). Moreover,
since 2 2 (0;=2),






< M2 + g(2)  

2













The eigenvalue corresponding to 1 = 0 is 1 = 1. We will show that the eigenvalue  correspond-
ing to 2 is the second largest. For this, it suces to show that  exceeds all remaining eigenvalues
(i) algebraically and (ii) in absolute value. For (i), note that implicit dierentiation of G(m+1) = 0
implies that m+1 is strictly increasing in m. For (ii), note that since 2 < =2,  > 1=3. Therefore,
 is the second largest eigenvalue, i.e.,  = 2.
Consider next the second column eigenvector. Since 2 solves equation (28) for m = 1, it is a
solution of equation (26), and thus of the equation with the \plus" sign in (24). Equation (21) then
implies that 1 =  2, and equation (19) implies that
vi = 21 sin(i):
Therefore, the second column eigenvector is proportional to vc
i.
Consider nally the second row eigenvector. Theorem 6 implies that the relative social inuence
weights are 2 for agents M and 3 for all other agents. Theorem 7 then implies that the second row
eigenvector is proportional to vr
i. Regarding the extreme components of vr
i, we only need to show
that for M  2, vr
M 1  vr
M, i.e.,
3sin[(M   1)2]  2sin[M2]:
Since 2 solves equation (28) for m = 1, it is a solution of equation (25). Using that equation to
substitute sin[(M   1)2], we need to show that
(62   5)sin[M2]  0:
37Since M2 < =2, we have sin[M2] > 0. Moreover, for M = 2, 2 = 5=6 (this can be checked
numerically), and since 2 is strictly increasing in M, 2 > 5=6 for M > 2. k
Proof of Theorem 9: See Aldous and Fill [1999, Ch. 9] and the references therein. A sketch of































Consider now the mapping F that to a spanning tree G with i at the root, and to an agent j 6= i,
associates the tree F(G;j) constructed by taking the \subtree" of G formed by i and all of i's subtrees
except that containing j, and \pasting" it just below j. The range of F is the full set of spanning
trees with an agent other than i at the root, and thus F is one-to-one. Moreover, if k is the root of
F(G;j), we have (G)Tij = (F(G;j))Tki. This implies equation (29). k
Proof of Corollary 2: In the equal precision case, the weight an agent k gives to all agents he















The corollary then follows from Theorem 9. k
Proof of Theorem 10: We rst show that each non-isolated element of the partition P is linked
to at least one isolated element. This will also establish that the set of isolated elements of P is
nonempty. Consider a non-isolated element J of P that is linked only to non-isolated elements.
Then starting from J, we can construct a chain of linked, non-isolated elements. Since P contains
a nite number of elements, this chain must contain a cycle consisting of more than one elements.
But then all agents belonging to elements in this cycle are strongly connected, and therefore P is
not the partition dened by strong connectedness, a contradiction.
To determine agents' limit beliefs, we rst determine the matrix T1. By grouping agents ac-












where the mth set of rows, m = 1;:::;M, corresponds to the agents in the mth isolated set, Im, and
the M + 1th set of rows corresponds to the agents in the non-isolated sets. The matrix Tt has the
38same form as T, except that Tm is replaced by Tt






As in Theorem 1, the matrix Tt
m converges to a limit T1
m, each row of which is equal to w(Im). The
matrix Qt converges to 0. Indeed, denoting by qj;t the maximum element in the jth column of Qt,
















qj;t ) qj;t+1  qj;t;
where the second implication follows from the elements Q being non-negative, and the last from
each row of Q summing to at most one. Since qj;t is decreasing and bounded below (by zero), it
must converge to a limit qj. To show that qj = 0, we note that each agent in a non-isolated set is
inuenced by agents in isolated sets, after enough communication rounds. Therefore, there exists t
such that all rows of Qt
sum to strictly less than 1, and thus less than 1    for some  > 0. Using
equation Qt+t
= Qt
Qt, and proceeding as before, we get
qj;t+t  (1   )qj;t:
Therefore, qj = 0, and thus the matrix Qt converges to zero. Since Tt
m converges to T1
m and Qt






This fully determines the matrix T1. As in Theorem 1, T1 is also the limit of
Qt 1
s=0 T(s) for all
t satisfying Assumption 1.
The limit beliefs of an agent i are given by the ith row of T1x0. If i belongs to the isolated set





























Agent i's limit beliefs are thus a weighted average of the limit beliefs of the agents in the isolated
sets. The weight corresponding to the set Im is non zero if the ith row of the matrix
P1
s=0 QsRm1 is
non zero. This occurs precisely when i is inuenced by an agent in Im after enough communication
rounds, i.e., when the set J is linked to Im. k
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Figure 3: Two-Dimensional Neighborhood Example of Section IV.B. First Number gives Inuence
Weight (%), Second Number gives the Long-Run Position, V c
i2.
 












Figure 4: Long-Run Positions for the Linear Neighborhood Example of Section IV.C. (M = 1000)
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Figure 6: Spanning Trees for Agents 3 and 4 in Example 1.
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